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It is now commonly acknowledged that much early theorising concerning modal notions
suffered from various confusions and conflations. A major advance, at least in twentieth
century philosophy, was Kripke’s work, which brought great clarity too the nature of—
and varieties of—modality (e.g. Kripke 1963 and Kripke 1980). The background to much
of Kripke’s work in this area concerns issues in the model-theoretic semantics for modal
logic, especially quantified modal logic and the forceful Quinean objections to such an
enterprise (e.g. Quine 1947 and Quine 1953b). Quine insisted that quantifying into modal
contexts was incoherent, since the truth of a formula ∃xFx would require the satisfaction
of the embedded open formula Fx by some object. But Quine insisted that it didn’t make
sense to say of an object that it must (or might) have some property, independently of
how the object was described. For example, what could it mean for an object a to satisfy
p(x > 7)q? It seems to matter whether a is described as “the number 8” or as “the number
of planets”. Consider the contrast between (1) and (2):
(1) (the number of planets > 7)
(2) (8 > 7)
When giving this objection Quine understood “necessity” in terms of semantical necessity,
or analyticity, or apriority (as did the modal logicians he was most immediately reacting to,
e.g. Ruth Barcan (1946) and Rudolf Carnap (1947)). In those terms his point is that while it
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makes sense to say that “the inventor of bifocals is the inventor of bifocals” is semantically
necessary (i.e. analytic), it makes little sense to say that the inventor of bifocals (i.e. Ben
Franklin) is such that it is analytic that he is the inventor of bifocals. If it makes any sense
at all to say of an object that px is the inventor of bifocalsq is analytically true of it, it would
seem to depend on how that object was described (e.g. “the inventor of bifocals” versus
“the founder of the American Philosophical Society”).
After distinguishing various notions of modality—epistemic, semantical, and metaphysical—
Kripke responds to the Quinean worry by shifting the focus to the objective or metaphysical
understanding of modality, whereby he insists that it makes perfect sense talk about what
properties certain objects had to have had or what properties they could have lacked (see
Burgess 1998). And he insists that the person who objects to these common sense notions
along the Quinean lines is being a philosopher in the pejorative sense:
Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, ‘That’s the guy who might
have lost’. Someone else says, ‘Oh no, if you describe him as Nixon, then he
might have lost; but, of course, describing him as the winner, then it is not true
that he might have lost’. Now which one is being the philosopher, here, the
unintuitive man? (Kripke 1980: 41)
In the background Kripke has a model-theory for quantified modal logic whereby a
formula such as ‘Fx’ is true of an object independently of how it is described or denoted.
This is due to the fact that on this, now standard, “objectual” interpretation of quantified
modal logic the value of a variable relative to an assignment is independent of the world
parameter (variables are rigid de jure) and modals don’t meddle with the assignment
parameter.
To see this consider a standard version of modal predicate logic with identity. In addi-
tion to brackets, the basic symbols consist of the following:
Variables: x, y, z, . . .
Predicates: F,G,H, . . .
Constants: ¬,∧, ∃, =, 
For any sequence of variables, α1, . . . , αn, any n-place predicate pi, and any variables α and
β, the sentences of the language are provided by the following definition:
2
φ ::= piα1 . . . αn | α = β | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | ∃αφ | φ
Let a model A = 〈W,R,D, I〉, where W is a (non-empty) set of worlds, R is a binary
relation on W (an accessibility relation), D is a (non-empty) set of individuals, and I is the
interpretation, which relative to a world assigns the predicates sets of tuples of individuals
drawn from D. We can then provide the semantic clauses relative to a variable assignment,
a world, and a model A as follows:
• JαKg,w = g(α)
• Jpiα1 . . . αnKg,w = 1 iff 〈Jα1Kg,w, . . . , JαnKg,w〉 ∈ I(pi,w)
• Jα = βKg,w = 1 iff JαKg,w = JβKg,w
• J¬φKg,w = 1 iff JφKg,w = 0
• Jφ ∧ ψKg,w = 1 iff JφKg,w = 1 and JψKg,w = 1
• J∃αφKg,w = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(α) , g(α),JφKg′,w = 1
• JφKg,w = 1 iff for all w′ such that wRw′, JφKg,w′ = 1
Many have agreed with Kripke that this interpretation of quantified modal logic fits well
with an “objective” understanding of the modals, e.g. the kinds of readings of modals that
linguistics might label nomological, historical, or circumstantial. Kripke’s work ushered
in intense philosophical and logical investigation of these objective modalities—with a
special focus on the most general variety, which Kripke called metaphysical modality.
But, as is well known, there are other “flavors” of modality (see Kratzer 1977). The
standard semantics for quantified modal logic may not be the most appropriate for certain
varieties of modality—in particular, the epistemic modalities. Philosophical discussions
have tended to echo Kripke’s stance on epistemic modality—it is often mentioned in order
to distinguish it from genuine metaphysical modality, but is then quickly set aside as “merely
epistemic”.1 In an unpublished note from the late 1990s David Chalmers (unpublished)
1This attitude was probably more prevalent ten years ago than it is today. There has been a recent flurry of
interest in epistemic modalities mostly stemming from issues in the contextualism/relativism literature, see
Egan and Weatherson (2011). Even here quantified epistemic modality or epistemic modality de re has not
been of primary focus—yet important explorations in this vein include Gerbrandy (1997), Gerbrandy (2000),
Aloni (2005), Yalcin (2015), Swanson (2010), Chalmers (2011), and Ninan (forthcoming), “Quantification and
Epistemic Modality”.
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suggests that the post-Kripkean era has been complicit in a “tyranny of the subjunctive”.
He insists that the discussion has been overly biased toward metaphysical modality, and
that epistemic necessity deserves the same focus and study as metaphysical necessity (see
also Chalmers 2011). Chalmers invites us to imagine an alternative universe in which
Kripke instead focused primarily on epistemic modality. Chalmers suggests that Kripke
would have written a completely different book, perhaps called Naming and possibility,
within which he, among other things would:
• defend a link between necessity and apriority
• argue for a more descriptivist view of names
• argue against the necessity of identity, and
• have a different view about de re modality and quantified modal logic.
Even the actual Kripke admits that although identities are metaphysically necessary, they
are not epistemically necessary. He maintains that “for all we knew in advance, Hesperus
wasn’t Phosphorus” (Kripke 1980: 104), and that “we do not know a priori that Hesperus is
Phosphorus” (ibid.).2 When discussing the sense in which prior to empirical investigation
it could turn out either way whether Hesperus is Phosphorus, he says
. . . there is one sense in which things might turn out either way. . . Obviously,
the ‘might’ here is purely ‘epistemic’—it merely expresses our present state of
ignorance, or uncertainty. (ibid.: 103)
Although Kripke is downplaying the “merely” epistemic possibility, he nevertheless seems
to be committed to the claim that an agent could use an epistemic modal to truly say
“Hesperus might not be Phosphorus”. Agents can be ignorant of metaphysical necessities
and we can express such ignorance using epistemic modals. To get a solid example on the
table consider this one:
2Kripke in fact makes many statements about what might turn out (or might have turned out) in the
epistemic sense, which are not possible in the metaphysical sense, e.g. he admits that Nixon might be an
automaton (46), a certain wooden table might have been, given certain evidence, made of ice (145-146), and
Gold might not to be an element (143), etc.: “If I say, ‘Gold might turn out not to be an element’, I speak
correctly; ‘might’ here is epistemic and expresses the fact that the evidence does not justify a priori (Cartesian)
certainly that gold is an element” (Kripke 1980: 143fn72). See also Kripke (1971), footnote 15.
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An ancient astronomer has been investigating the moons of various celestial bodies.
She has gathered various evidence from observation and geometrical calculation. In
the mornings she has been investigating a celestial body that she calls ‘Phosphorus’.
The visibility in the morning is poor, but given certain evidence she suspects it has
a moon. Also there is a celestial body that she calls ‘Hesperus’, which she has been
investigating in the evenings. She has been able to collect an immense amount of
evidence, and according to her best geometrical models it’d be inconsistent with the
data for it to have a moon.
Given this situation, it would be felicitous for the astronomer to say each of the following:
(3) Phosphorus might have a moon.
(4) Hesperus must not have a moon.
And this is so even though Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus. But on the standard
interpretation (3) and (4) cannot both be true, since the following sentences would have to
be be jointly satisfiable (where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are the two names of the planet, and ‘M’ is the
predicate “having a moon”):
x = y ^Mx ¬^My
But, of course, they can’t be. To satisfy the latter two it must be that:
J^MxKg,w , J^MyKg,w
That can only be if g(x) , g(y), but to satisfy the first it must be that g(x) = g(y).3
Returning to the discussion of Quine’s objection to quantified modal logic. It seems
that Kripke is right that the following is confused:
[Winning the 1968 election] is a contingent property of Nixon only relative to
our referring to him as ‘Nixon’. But if we designate Nixon as ‘the man who
3Since we are presumably in a different epistemic state than this astronomer some might insist that we
should not accept her utterances. This feature is well-known in the contextualism/relativism literature. To
avoid this complication it may be better to consider an example that avoids it. Consider utterances of “Bansky
might be Robert Del Naja” and “Banksy might be Robin Gunningham”. It seems that both are true, but they
can’t be given and the standard semantic assumptions combined with the fact that Robert Del Naja is distinct
from Robin Gunningham.
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won the election in 1968’, then it will be a [metaphysically] necessary truth, of
course, that the man who won the election in 1968, won the election in 1968.
(Kripke 1980: 40)
In other words, the relevant reading of
(5) The winner might not have been the winner
is perfectly fine. But altering it to epistemic modality gets the opposite result.
Winning the 1968 election is not epistemically necessary of Nixon relative to
our referring to him as ‘Nixon’. But if we designate Nixon as ‘the man who
won the election in 1968’, then it will be epistemically necessary, of course, that
the man who won the election in 1968, won the election in 1968.
Or in other words, as Yalcin (2015) has pointed out, there is no true reading of the following
epistemic claim:
(6) The winner might not be the winner
Whether or not a property holds of an object by epistemic possibility (or necessity) seems
to depend on how that object is described. But this, of course, is in direct conflict with
the standard interpretation of quantified modal logic. These issues concerning epistemic
modality de re, in particular, are not really settled by Kripke’s discussion—they are ig-
nored, and thus in the epistemic case there remain residual Quinean worries (cf. Burgess
1998 and Chalmers 2011: 89). These questions remain: What is the status of epistemic
modality de re and “quantifying in” to epistemic contexts? What changes to the model-
theory are required to accommodate quantified epistemic modality? And most directly
how should we interpret variables under epistemic modals so that “x = y” holds while
“(x = y)” doesn’t?
In one form or another these questions have been addressed since the mid-1900s, and
I can’t hope to answer them in a completely comprehensive and satisfactory way here.
My modest aim here is to run a continuous thread through various existing strands that
are already in the literature, highlight lessons along the way, and sketch out an appealing
approach to quantified epistemic modality. I make no claim to novelty in detail—my
contributions here involve summary, emphasis, and gestures toward new horizons.
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Central to my discussion is the idea that certain modals ought to be understood
as “assignment-shifting” devices: Various theorists have been toying with assignment-
shifting treatments of epistemic contexts such as attitude verbs and epistemic modals (e.g.,
Cumming 2008, Santorio 2012, Ninan 2012, Pickel 2015, Rieppel 2017). On such views an
epistemic “” ends up binding the x in Fx. One might worry that this kind of binding
yields the undesirable result that any attempt to “quantify in” to an epistemic environment
is blocked, e.g. ∃xFx would be a case of vacuous quantification. If quantifying into the
relevant constructions is vacuous, then such views would seem hopelessly misguided and
empirically inadequate.4
Here there are enlightening, and perhaps surprising, connections to a famous alterna-
tive to Kripke’s semantics for quantified modal logic, namely Lewis’ counterpart semantics
(Lewis 1968). In an important sense these assignment-shifting treatments of modals just
are versions of a counterpart semantics—or the other way round: Lewis’ counterpart
semantics treats the boxes and diamonds as assignment-shifting (in addition to worlds-
shifting) devices. Thus, similar worries about quantifying in and vacuity arise for Lewis’
counterpart semantics—in the well-known footnote 13, just before giving the “Humphrey
objection”, Kripke (1980) complains precisely about this by insisting that Lewis’ view
“suffers from a purely formal difficulty”. But as I’ll demonstrate below the mere fact that
a variable is bound is no obstacle to binding it. This provides a helpful lesson for those
modelling de re epistemic contexts with assignment sensitivity, and perhaps leads the
way toward the proper treatment of binding in both metaphysical and epistemic contexts:
Kripke for objective modality, Lewis for epistemic modality.
1 Binding the bound
Let’s start with some folk wisdom concerning quantification and binding that turns out
to be false—obviously false, perhaps, but the counterexample brings out the devices that
4One might insist, on the contrary, that blocking quantification into epistemic contexts is a feature, not a
bug. One might insist that de re epistemic modality doesn’t even make sense, or one might insist that there are
certain constraints on the scopal interaction of quantifiers with epistemic modals which disallow quantifying
in, see the Epistemic Containment Principle of Von Fintel and Iatridou (2003). While there may be certain
kinds of constructions that don’t allow for the quantifier to scope over the epistemic modal (“everyone inside
might be outside”), it also seems clear that there are cases of quantifying in, e.g. after painting the ceiling I
might warn you to walk carefully by saying: “Almost every square inch of the floor might have paint on it”
(Swanson 2010; see also Yalcin 2015). Or discussing the lottery I might say “Every ticket is very likely to have
lost” (cf. the cases pointed to in Lennertz 2015).
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may prove useful for modelling epistemic contexts. Consider this formula of first-order
logic:
(7) ∀x∃xFx
This is a paradigm example of what is called “vacuous quantification”. The occurrence of
the variable ‘x’ in ‘Fx’ is already bound by ‘∃x’ in the subformula ‘∃xFx’, thus prefixing
‘∀x’ is idle—the universal quantifier is vacuous. For example, the following is a theorem
concerning vacuous quantification from introductory logic texts (see, e.g., Kalish and
Montague 1964: 164-65).
(8) ∀x∃xFx↔ ∃xFx
In general, one might insist on the following principle concerning binding and vacuity.
the principle of vacuous quantification. If all the variables in a formula φ
are bound, then for any quantifier Σ, Σφ↔ φ.
In slogan: You can’t bind a bound variable! This is the bit of folk wisdom that isn’t ex-
actly correct. There is more going on with “vacuous quantification” than is commonly
recognised.
In order to show that the the Principle of Vacuous Quantification is false I will introduce
a simple language that sticks close to the syntax and semantics of first-order logic—this
helps to demonstrate that there is nothing tricky going on in my counterexample.
Bear with me while I set out the formalities. First we define the syntax. In addition to
parenthesis, the basic symbols consist of the following:
Variables: x, y, z, . . .
Predicates: F,G,H, . . .
Connectives: ¬, ∧
Quantifiers: ∃, R
For any sequence of variables α1, . . . , αn, any n-place predicate pi, and any variable α, the
sentences of the language are provided by the following grammar:
φ ::= piα1 . . . αn | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | ∃αφ | Rαφ
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This language looks essentially like predicate logic, and we can define the other usual
operators (e.g. ‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘∀’, etc.) as abbreviations in terms of our basic symbols. The
only novel thing about the language, thus far, is the addition of a new quantifier symbol
‘
R
’. There is nothing interesting about it syntactically, and although it will be given an
interpretation that is different from ‘∃’ it is essentially a kind of existential quantifier.
Turning to the semantics, let a model A = 〈D, I〉, where D is a (non-empty) set of
individuals and I is an interpretation function, which assigns values to the predicates.
Since our language has variable-binding operators we relativise to an assignment, which
assigns values to the variables. An assignment g is a function from the set of variables to
set of individuals D. We provide the following recursive semantics, in the style of Tarski,
by recursively defining 1 (truth or satisfaction) relative to an assignment g:5
• JαKg = g(α)
• Jpiα1 . . . αnKg = 1 iff 〈Jα1Kg, . . . , JαnKg〉 ∈ I(pi)
• J¬φKg = 1 iff JφKg = 0
• Jφ ∧ ψKg = 1 iff JφKg = 1 and JψKg = 1
• J∃αφKg = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(α) , g(α), JφKg′ = 1
• J RαφKg = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(α) > g(α), JφKg′ = 1
The last clause deserves comment, since it appeals to the greater than relation. For this
to make sense, of course, the individuals in D have to be ordered: we could impose an
ordering on any domain, but let’s instead just assume that D is the set of natural numbers
with their natural ordering. It is not essential to my argument that we use this particular
relation, nor that we order the domian. But a nice relation like this helps to keep the initial
set up simple, and then one can generalise after seeing the key point. Notice that ‘
R
’ is
very similar to ‘∃’ in that it is an existential quantifier, but it only “looks” at a subset of the
assignments that ‘∃’ looks at. ‘∃’ is the “for some” quantifier, while ‘ R’ is the “for some
greater” quantifier.
Consider the following sentence of our language:
(9)
R
xFx
5Here we will not worry about the distinction between “satisfaction by a sequence” and “truth”—of course,
Tarski reserves truth for formulae that are satisfied by all sequences.
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Certainly, in (9) the variable in the embedded formula ‘Fx’ is bound by the quantifier ‘
R
x’.
claim 1. All the variables in ‘
R
xFx’ are bound.
This claim seems innocent enough, but some may suspect some kind of trickery: some
sleight of hand with the operative notion of “binding” or some variable up my sleeve. Are
all the variables in ‘
R
xFx’ really bound? Standardly, an occurrence of a variable α is said to
be bound in a formula just in case it is immediately attached to the quantifier or within the
scope of a quantifier that is indexed with α (and free otherwise). So in a formula such as
‘(∃xFx∧Gy)’ both occurrences of ‘x’ are bound, while the occurrence of ‘y’ is free. Clearly,
given this standard definition, all the occurrences of variables in ‘
R
xFx’ are bound.
Thus, if we can establish that prefixing a quantifier, such as ‘∃x’, to (9) is not idle, then
we will have a counterexample to the Principle of Vacuous Quantification. More precisely,
we will demonstrate the following (for some model A):
claim 2. J∃x RxFxK , J RxFxK
We are assuming that D is the set of natural numbers, and let’s also assume a particular
interpretation for ‘F’, namely I(F) = {8}. So ‘F’ is only true of 8. Provided this model,
consider the truth conditions of (9) relative to some assignment g, which are calculated as
follows:
J RxFxKg = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(x) > g(x), JFxKg′ = 1
iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(x) > g(x), g′(x) ∈ I(F)
iff for some n ≥ g(x),n = 8.
Assume g(x) = 10, then since, of course, there isn’t an n ≥ 10 such that n = 8, it follows
that J RxFxKg = 0. Now let’s drop the hammer: embed ‘ RxFx’ under ‘∃x’:
(10) ∃x RxFx
By calculating the truth conditions (relative to the same model) we see that the outer
quantifier is not vacuous:
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J∃x RxFxKg = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(x) , g(x), J RxFxKg′ = 1
iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(x) , g(x),
for some g′′ that differs from g′ at most in that g′′(x) > g′(x), g′′(x) ∈ I(F)
iff for some m, for some n ≥ m,n = 8.
Since there is an m and an n such that n ≥ m and n = 8, it follows that J∃x RxFxKg = 1.
Thus, relative to this model and assignment g, J RxFxKg = 0, while J∃x RxFxKg = 1. This
completes the proof that J∃x RxFxK , J RxFxK, and thus that the following biconditional is
not valid (it is false at g):
(11) ∃x RxFx↔ RxFx
This provides a simple counterexample to the Principle of Vacuous Quantification. Thus,
even when all the variables in a formula φ are bound, prefixing a quantifier Σ to φ can be
non-vacuous.6
Now let’s take stock. If we restrict our focus to standard first-order logic, then the
Principle of Vacuous Binding clearly holds, so what is the essential difference introduced
by the ‘
R
’ quantifier? First-order quantifiers (e.g. ‘∃’ and ‘∀’) are standardly appointed
a special kind of stability—one that is not essential to their status as variable-binding
operators. The set of α-variants that ‘∃’ looks to when assessing its embedded formula
are not at all constrained by what the initial variable assignment assigns to α, so shifting
what the input assignment assigns to αwill be idle. Whereas, the set of α-variants that ‘
R
’
looks to when assessing its embedded formula are constrained by what the initial variable
assignment assigns to α—they have to assign something greater than (or equal to) what
6But what about the claim that bound variables can be re-bound? Does prefixing ‘∃x’ to ‘ RxFx’ result in ‘x’
being rebound? I think so, but I’m not so interested in explicitly defending it here, since this turns on some
subtle terminological issues. We’d need a definition of when a quantifier binds a particular occurrence of a
variable in a formula. There is a standard definition of this in terms of syntax which stipulates that a bound
variable can’t be re-bound (see e.g. Heim and Kratzer 1998: 120). So, even though a natural way to describe
the counterexample above would be to say that ‘∃x’ rebinds the last occurrence of ‘x’, this is ruled out by
a standard definition. What’s going on? Under the stress of the counterexample the syntactic definition of
binding is pulling apart from the background semantic understanding of binding. The class of “variables”
and “quantifiers” (or variables-binders in general) are grouped together due to their interesting semantic
properties, not their syntactic properties. Thus, in this more fundamental semantic sense we should say that
a quantifier binds an occurrence of a variable in a formula when the sensitivity of the variable is affected by
the shifting induced by the quantifier. It is in the semantic sense that you can bind a bound variable.
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the initial variable assignment assigns to α—thus shifting the input assignment can make
a difference. In this way, ‘∃’ standardly has a certain indifference to the input assignment,
whereas for ‘
R
’ the input assignment genuinely matters—‘
R
’ is “context” sensitive.7
This suggests that the essential difference between ‘∃’ and ‘ R’ concerns the accessibility
relations involved. Thus, it can be illuminating at this point to view first-order logic
as a modal logic in the way associated with Amsterdam (see Van Benthem 1977 and
especially Blackburn et al. 2002, §7.5 on reverse correspondence theory). On this way
of viewing things, the assignments are the “worlds”, and the model includes a stock of
binary accessibility relations Rα that hold between assignments (relative to a variable α).
Standard first-order logic is only concerned with a special subset of all the possible such
models for first-order languages—that is, it constrains itself to a particular accessibility
relation:
g ≡α g′ iff g′ differs from g at most in that g′(α) , g(α)
Notice that ≡α is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. So given standard assumptions
the accessibility relation between assignments is an equivalence relation, and thus will
validate the relevant formulae corresponding to S5, which will include the following
theorems concerning vacuous quantification:
∀x∀xφ↔ ∀xφ
∃x∀xφ↔ ∀xφ
∃x∃xφ↔ ∃xφ
∀x∃xφ↔ ∃xφ
Prefixing further quantifiers to a closed sentence in standard first-order logic is “vacuous”—
just as adding further boxes and diamonds is vacuous in an S5 modal logic. But—just as
in modal logic—the relevant equivalencies only hold given particular restrictions on the
accessibility relation. For example, φ → φ is invalid unless the frame is transitive.
Likewise, if Rx is not transitive, then ∀xφ→ ∀x∀xφ will be invalid.
To round off this point, consider again the the quantifier ‘
R
’ and the accessibility
relation that it appeals to:
7An alternative way to put the difference here is to say that standard first-order quantifiers take an
“external” perspective, whereas a quantifier like ‘
R
’ must take an “internal” perspective on the relevant
relational structures (see Recanati 2007, 65-71 and Blackburn et al. 2002, xi-x).
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g ≥α g′ iff g′ differs from g at most in that g′(α) > g(α)
This relation is reflexive and transitive, but it is not symmetric. And our counterexample
to the vacuous quantification principle implicitly exploited the fact that the relation was
not symmetric. Notice that, in general, if the accessibility relation between assignments
is not assumed to be symmetric then the paradigm example of vacuous quantification
mentioned at the outset becomes invalid.
(8) ∀x∃xFx↔ ∃xFx
Consider the right-to-left direction: If someone taller than me is happy, it doesn’t follow
that everyone taller than me is such that there is someone taller than them that is happy.8
One can imagine that by generalising and playing around with the first-order accessibility
relations there are things of intrinsic interest to metalogic, e.g. concerning decidability
(see discussion in Blackburn et al. 2002: 466-469), but the application we are concerned
with is modeling epistemic contexts—and the key insight here is that assignment-shifting
operators can non-trivially stack.
2 Variables in counterpart semantics
As I mentioned at the outset the discussion above has illuminating connections to Lewis’
counterpart semantics (Lewis 1968). The connection is that in counterpart semantics the
falsity of the Principle of Vacuous Binding is presupposed. Let me explain.
Lewis provides a first-order translation for formulae of quantified modal logic such
as the following (where ‘W’ is the property of being a world, ‘I’ is the relation that holds
between an object z and a world y when z is in y, and ‘C’ is the counterpart relation):
Fx ≈ ∀y∀z((Wy ∧ Izy ∧ Czx)→ Fz)
8There is a tight connection here between ‘
R
’ and the kinds of quantifiers used for knowledge representation
by description logics, e.g. ‘∃R’ (see Blackburn 2006 and Baader et al. 2003): they both restrict to the set of
individuals that bear a relation to the input individual. The sentences of description logic function much
like the sentences of Priori’s Egocentric logic such as “Someone-more-perfect standing”, which is true at an
individual a iff there is an x such that x is more perfect than a and x is standing (see Prior 1968).
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This says (roughly) that every counterpart of x, in any world, is an F. And such a translation
generalises for any modalised open sentence ppiα1 . . . αnq. Lewis demonstrates how we
can follow the translation procedure, and then provide the resulting first-order formulae
with their standard first-order interpretation, thereby endowing the modal formulae with
truth-conditions.
But the intermediate translation is not required. We can instead directly provide a
model-theoretic semantics for the language of quantified modal logic that corresponds to
Lewis’ translation rules (See Hazen 1979, Cresswell and Hughes (1996: 353-358), and espe-
cially Schwarz 2012). And this is where things get interesting. Since we are only concerned
with the model-theoretic semantics—not with certain metaphysical commitments—we
will follow the advice of Schwarz (2012), who says:
. . . we should dissociate counterpart semantics from various Lewisian doc-
trines that are commonly lumped together under the heading of “counterpart
theory”. (Schwarz 2012: 9)
So, in particular, we are not here concerned with modal realism, world-bound agents (i.e.
Postulate 2), or Lewis’ specific commitments on the similarity relation and counterpart-
hood.9 We are instead concerned with model-theoretic counterpart semantics.
For our purposes the interesting action is going to be with modalised sentences such
as ‘Fx’ and binding into such formulae. First, think about how we might interpret a
modalised formulae such as ‘Fx’. This says, roughly, that every counterpart of x, in
any world, is an F, so we need to evaluate the embedded open formula ‘Fx’ relative to
every counterpart of the individual assigned to x at every accessible world. Thus, if
‘Fx’ is evaluated at a variable assignment g and world w, then ‘Fx’ must be evaluated
at assignments g′ where g′(x) in a world is a “counterpart” of g(x) in w. In this way, the
modal shifts the assignment and effectively binds all the variables in its scope. In general,
the clause for will yield:
9Postulate 2 stipulates that “Nothing is in two worlds”. In footnote 2, Lewis (1968) entertains the idea of
allowing identities across worlds by giving up Postulate 2, but later clarifies that he is firmly committed to
Postulate 2: “Footnote 2 has given some readers the impression that I regard Postulate 2 as a mere convention,
and that we could just as truly say that some things are identical with their otherworldly counterparts after
all. Not so. I was alluding to the possibility of a hybrid theory—a theory opposed to my own, a theory which
I take to be false—according to which there are identities across worlds, but we use the counterpart relation
anyway” (Lewis 1983: 46). We are setting aside Lewis’ particular metaphysical commitments that lead him
to oppose the hybrid theory.
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pφq is true relative to a world w and assignment g iff φ is true relative to all
w-accessible worlds w′ and assignments g′ that assign to each free variable α
in φ a counterpart g′(α) at w′ of g(α) at w.
The model, then, should include a relation on world-assignment pairs, which encodes the
counterpart relations.
The counterpart relation and the assignment meddling of the modals is the most inter-
esting departure from the basic Kripke semantics. The rest of the semantics is essentially
the same. But just to have a full model on display let’s fill out the rest. Let the language
be modal predicate logic with identity, as defined above. Let a model A = 〈W,R,D, I〉,
where W is a (non-empty) set of worlds, R is a binary relation on DN ×W (an accessibility
relation incorporating the counterpart relation), D is a (non-empty) set of individuals, and
I is the interpretation, which relative to a world assigns the predicates sets of tuples of
individuals drawn from D.10 We can then provide the semantic clauses relative to a model
A as follows:
• JαKg,w = g(α)
• Jpiα1 . . . αnKg,w = 1 iff 〈Jα1Kg,w, . . . , JαnKg,w〉 ∈ I(pi,w)
• Jα = βKg,w = 1 iff JαKg,w = JβKg,w
• J¬φKg,w = 1 iff JφKg,w = 0
• Jφ ∧ ψKg,w = 1 iff JφKg,w = 1 and JψKg,w = 1
10Here I am loosely following Schwarz (2012), but there are a few differences in my presentation. Schwarz
has the counterpart relation hold between individual-world pairs, and then uses this to construct the required
alternative sequences (see p. 13ff ), whereas I have a counterpart relation on sequence of individuals and
world pairs. Both strategies allow for multiple counterparts at one world, but there are issues concerning
multiply de re modality that I must gloss over here (see Hazen 1979, 328-330, and Lewis 1983, 44-45). I also
assume a constant domain, while Schwarz doesn’t. This is just for ease of presentation. The counterpart
semantics can make all the same extra sophistications as the Kripke semantics can, e.g. with variable domains
or inner/outer domains, etc. In fact, there are good reasons to add such sophistications. Here is one for the
epistemic case: agents can think that there are more individuals that there in fact are. For example, assume the
domain has two elements: {Pythagorus, Venus}. If Pythagorus can truthfully say say “Hesperus might not be
Phosphorus”, then there is a world where a Hesperus-counterpart is distinct from a Phosphorus-counterpart.
But Pythagorus knows that he distinct from both Hesperus and Phosphorus, so the only candidates for
Hesperus- and Phosphorus-counterparts is Venus. Thus, the “might”-claim isn’t true unless we allow the
domains to vary with worlds or we do some trick with inner/outer domains. See how to do it in Schwarz
(2012).
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• J∃αφKg,w = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(α) , g(α),JφKg′,w = 1
• JφKg,w = 1 iff for all w′ and g′ such that 〈w, g〉R〈w′, g′〉, JφKg′,w′ = 1
Notice, again, in this last clause that the modal operator binds all the variables in its
scope. But since the assignments that ‘’ looks to when assessing its embedded formula
φ are constrained by what the initial variable assignment assigns to the variables in φ,
prefixing a quantifier to ‘φ’ needn’t be vacuous. So although the modal operator binds
the variables, they can be “re-bound”.
In fact, when addressing Kripke’s “purely formal objection” (1980, footnote 13), Lewis
(1983)—the postscript to the 1968 article—explicitly points out that his modal operators
bind the variables in their scope. The objection is that Lewis’ theory invalidates certain
cherished principles of the logic of identity and quantification. The way Lewis puts the
objection is that his counterpart theory seems to invalidate Leibniz’s Law, p∀x∀y(x = y→
(φx ↔ φy))q, since the following is not valid:
(12) ∀x∀y(x = y→ (^x , y↔ ^y , y))
But Lewis pleads “not guilty”. He insists that on his view (12) is not really an instance of
Leibniz’s Law for much the same reason that (13) isn’t an instance.
(13) ∀x∀y(x = y→ (∃y x , y↔ ∃y y , y))
Clearly, to think that (13) is an instance of Leibniz’s Law is, as Lewis says, “to commit a
fallacy of confusing bound variables”. Lewis insists that the same holds for (12), since the
modals bind the variables in their scope.11
The abbreviated notation of quantified modal logic conceals the true pattern of
binding . . . The diamonds conceal quantifiers that bind the occurrences of ‘x’
and ‘y’ that follow. . . . So counterpart theory is no threat to standard logic. It
is only a threat to simplistic methods of keeping track of variable-binding and
instancehood when we are dealing with the perversely abbreviated language
of quantified modal logic. (Lewis 1983: 46)
11See Schwarz (2012: 17-18) for discussion of the appropriate restrictions on substitution in a counterpart
semantics.
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Thus, this formal complaint against counterpart theory does not hold up to scrutiny.
The counterpart framework remains controversial. Some think that it has various at-
tractive metaphysical applications, e.g. it avoids the problem of accidental intrinsics, it
allows for paradox-resolving flexibility in the attribution of modal properties, and allows
for contingent identities, etc. While others think it is based on a confusion, or inherits
various implausible metaphysical commitments, or falls victim to the “Humphrey ob-
jection”. My purpose is not to weigh in on these ongoing debates over the counterpart
framework. But I do want to highlight that most of this controversy concerns whether
Kripke’s framework or Lewis’ counterpart framework provides the most plausible anal-
ysis of metaphysical modality. The debate, however, looks very different in the context of
epistemic modality. As I outlined already Kripke’s framework seems ill-suited for epis-
temic modality de re, but moreover the standard complaints against Lewis’ framework
lose much of their force in the epistemic setting.
Consider the Humprey objection. Kripke complains,
. . . if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the election (if only he had done
such-and-such)’, we are not talking about something that might have hap-
pened to Humphrey but to someone else, a “counterpart”. Probably, however,
Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much re-
sembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. (Kripke
1980: 45)
Even if one finds this appeal convincing in the case of metaphysical possibility, it seems
to miss the mark when aimed at a counterpart-theoretic analysis of epistemic modality.
Kripke himself reaches for counterpart-theoretic devices when explaining the epistemic
sense in which it might have turned out that Hesperus wasn’t Phosphorus.
And so it’s true that given the evidence that someone has antecedent to his
empirical investigation, he can be placed in a sense in exactly the same situation,
that is a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, and call two heavenly bodies
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, without their being identical. So in that sense
we can say that it might have turned out either way. (Kripke 1980: 103-104)
Thus the epistemic modal claim is true in virtue of “counterparts” of Hesperus and Phos-
phorus which are distinct in other worlds, not in virtue of Hesperus and Phosphorus
themselves being distinct in other worlds. With the counterpart framework in mind,
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one might read Kripke as putting forward the following suggestion: an epistemic use
of “Hesperus might not be Phosphorus” is true iff there is a world w compatible with
the speaker’s qualitative evidence where an epistemic counterpart of Hesperus in w is
distinct from an epistemic counterpart of Phosphorus in w.12 In fact, Kripke encourages
this counterpart-theoretic construal in the following passages:13
Here, then, the notion of ‘counterpart’ comes into its own. For it is not the ta-
ble, but and epistemic ‘counterpart’, which was hewn from ice; not Hesperus-
Phosporus-Venus, but two distinct counterparts thereof, in two of the roles
Venus actually plays (that of Evening Star and Morning Star), which are differ-
ent. . . if someone confuses the epistemological and the metaphysical problems,
he will be well on the way to the counterpart theory of Lewis and other have
advocated. (Kripke 1971, footnote 15)
. . . I (or some conscious being) could have been qualitatively in the same epistemic
situation that in fact obtains, I could have the same sensory evidence that I in
fact have, about a table which was made of ice. The situation is thus akin to the
one which inspired the counterpart theorists (Kripke 1980: 333)
The intuition that a certain table might have turned out to be made of ice concerns
“epistemic counterparts” of the table, the intuition that Hesperus could have turned out
to be distinct from Phosphorus concerns distinct counterparts of Venus. Of course, Kripke
is alluding to counterpart theory in a denigrating way: Lewis’ counterpart theory makes
sense for metaphysical modality only when you confuse it with epistemic modality. But
this also suggests a positive position: Lewis’ counterpart framework is is well-suited for
an analysis of epistemic modality.
12The following passage also strongly suggests this reading: “So two things are true: first, that we do not
know a priori that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and are in no position to find out the answer except empirically.
Second, this is so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistinguishable from the evidence we have
and determine the referents of the two names be positions of the two planets in the sky, without the planets
being the same.” (Kripke 1980: 104)
13Although one can read Kripke as suggesting this counterpart treatment of epistemic modality, I’m not
claiming that this is Kripke’s considered view. At times Kripke seems to suggest instead that talk of epistemic
modality always involves a kind of “loose speak”. On this reading, an epistemic use of “Hesperus might not
be Phosphorus” is strictly speaking false, but there is a rephrasal of it such as “There is a world compatible with
the speaker’s qualitative evidence where an epistemic counterpart of Hesperus is distinct from an epistemic
counterpart of Phosphorus”, which is true. See Bealer (2002), 81-83 for a nice discussion of this point.
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3 Variables in epistemic contexts
Recently theorists have been appealing to “assignment-shifting operators” in treatments
of certain natural language constructions such as attitude verbs and epistemic modals,
see, e.g., Cumming (2008), Santorio (2012), and Ninan (2012), Ninan (forthcoming). These
views all fall within the family of counterpart semantics, broadly construed, and share the
feature that the modals or attitude verbs bind all the variables in their scope. But there are
some differences in terms of motivation and implementation that are worth highlighting.
Cumming (2008) is concerned to provide a semantic view where belief attributions such
as “Biron thinks that Hesperus is visible” and “Biron thinks that Phosphorus is visible”
can differ in truth value. Cumming argues that both the Millian and the descriptivists
views are untenable, even though they each harbour a half-truth: (i) Millianism is correct
in maintaining that the referent of a name is not sensitive to the world parameter, (ii)
Descriptivism is correct that the referent of a name is shiftable in epistemic contexts. We
need an alternative that accommodates both if these features.
Cumming insists on two innovations. The first is that names should be semantically
represented as variables, so that particular uses of “Hesperus is visible” and “Phosphorus
is visible” will be equivalent to something like (14) and (15) respectively:
(14) x is visible
(15) y is visible
If variables are treated in the standard way then they retain their status as insensitive
to the world parameter. But they are sensitive to the assignment parameter, and this
allows for the second innovation. The second innovation is that attitude verbs quantify
over alternative assignments in addition to worlds. In Cumming’s terminology attitudes
verbs operate on open propositions, which are true and false with respect to a world and as-
signment. The justification for quantification over alternative assignments is that doxastic
possibilities for an agent encode both information about the world and about the reference
relation:
. . . verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like ‘think’, are treated as oper-
ators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. . . . This
conforms to the intuition that the content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates
referential uncertainty.
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My treatment of attitude verbs as operators that shift the assignment tallies
with the reflection that attitude ascriptions can convey things about how an
agent conceives of the reference relation (in addition to how they conceive of
the world).
One needn’t construe the epistemic possibilities involved in this overtly meta-linguistic
way. Formally, it amounts to the same thing but its perhaps better to construe the un-
certainly involved as the agent’s uncertainty about which individual x is, instead of the
agent’s uncertainly about which individual “x” refers to. In any case, a belief report will
have truth-conditions such as the following:
“Biron believes x is visible” is true iff for each assignment-world pair 〈g,w〉 in
Biron’s belief set, g maps ‘x’ onto an object that is visible at w
The official way that Cumming implements this in the model theory is as follows, where
“τ” is an agent relativised belief operator and doxastic accessibility for each agent τ is
given by a relation doxτ between W and DN ×W:
JτφKg,w = 1 iff for all g′ and w′ such that doxτ(w, 〈g′,w′〉), JφKg′,w′ = 1
On this approach the truth of “τFx” does not depend on what the input assignment
assigns to “x”, thus we get the result that straightforward quantifying in with objectual
binders is blocked. That is, for Cumming “” not only unselectively binds all the variables
in its scope it does so in a way that renders the resulting formula insensitive to the input
assignment. Seemingly aware of this, Cumming (2008) instead appeals to substitutional
quantification as a means of quantifying into attitude contexts—the machinery employed
is inspired by Kaplan’s (1968) treatment of de re attitude ascriptions. But Pickel (2015)
has shown that the insensitivity of “τFx” to the input assignment combined with the
substitutional quantifiers nevertheless lead to undesirable results (see Pickel 2015: 339-
341 and Rieppel 2017: 248-250).14
14Pickel instead provides a two-factor view where the truth of “Fx” depends on both (i) the truth of
“Fx” relative to shifted assignments (at the shifted worlds) and (ii) relative to the input assignment (at
the shifted worlds). The latter conjunct gives rise to the arguably bad result that utterances of “Olivia
believes that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus” (and presumably “Hesperus might not be Phosphorus”)
cannot be true—attitude reports have become overly sensitive to the input assignment. In terms of epistemic
counterparts, Pickel’s strategy allows for some of x’s counterparts in other worlds to be distinct from x, but
nevertheless requires that x itself is always among x’s counterparts in other worlds.
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Santorio (2012) points to close cousins of the problems with names in attitude reports,
namely cases where indexicals occurring under epistemic modals seem to shift. Consider
the case of mad Heimson.15
Heimson is a bit crazy, and takes himself to be a philosopher of the Scottish
Enlightenment, but he’s uncertain which one he is: Stewart, Hume, or Smith.
Alone in his study, he says to himself, “I might be Hume”.
Since for all Heimson knows he is Hume, it seems that Heimson’s utterance of (16) is true
(or at least, true relative to his epistemic state).
(16) I might be Hume.
But on a standard treatment of indexicals and modals Heimson’s utterance would be
false. The pronoun gets its value from the contextually determined assignment function—
and thus refers to Heimson—while the modal quantifies over worlds compatible with
Heimson’s evidence. Thus Heimson’s utterance of (16) is true only if there is a world
where Heimson is identical to Hume. But there is no such world, so on the standard view
(16) is false. Santorio makes the following suggestion:
When ‘I’ occurs under an informational modal, it refers not to the actual
speaker, but rather to representatives of the actual speaker in the relevant
information state. Think of an information state as a set of possible worlds,
namely, the worlds that are compatible with the relevant attitude.. . . Roughly,
[the] representatives are individuals that, for all the subject knows, the speaker
might be. (Santorio 2012: 373)
This is formally carried out by making a certain adjustment to the semantics of modals.
On the standard view, informational modals are, in essence, quantifiers over
possible worlds. On the view I’m advocating, they also encode in their mean-
ing an apparatus that locates real-world individuals within the set of worlds
quantified over. Thus on the new picture these modals manipulate a greater
amount of information. . . [This] is implemented by letting epistemic operators
manipulate the assignment parameter. . . (Santorio 2012: 376)
15This is a somewhat simplified version of the kinds of examples that Santorio (2012) actually uses.
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Santorio builds contextually variable counterpart functions into the semantics, which “spec-
ify a way in which the subject of the epistemic state is acquainted with elements of the
context” (ibid.). Formally, a counterpart function f is a function from worlds to individ-
uals (i.e. an individual concept). For each variable x1, x2, . . . the context supplies both a
value g(1), g(2), . . . for the variable and a counterpart function f1, f2, . . . associated with
the variable. Then relative to an assignment g, a world w, and a sequence of counterpart
functions F = f1, f2, . . . the clause for epistemic might and must are as follows:
Jmight φKg,w,F = 1 iff
(i) [ f1(w) = g(1)] ∧ [ f2(w) = g(2)] ∧ [ f3(w) = g(3)] ∧ . . . and,
(ii) for some 〈g′,w′〉 such that w′Rw and g′ = 〈 f1(w′), f2(w′), . . . 〉, JφKg′,w′ = 1
Jmust φKg,w,F = 1 iff
(i) [ f1(w) = g(1)] ∧ [ f2(w) = g(2)] ∧ [ f3(w) = g(3)] ∧ . . . and,
(ii) for all 〈g′,w′〉 such that w′Rw and g′ = 〈 f1(w′), f2(w′), . . . 〉, JφKg′,w′ = 1
Thus, (16), which is regimented as “^ x = h” can come out true in a context.16 It is true
just in case the counterpart function f associated with ‘x’ picks out Heimson in the actual
world and there is a world w′ compatible with Heimson’s information state such that
“x = h” is satisfied by w′ and a shifted assignment g′, where g′(x) = f (w′) – that is, just
in case there is a world compatible with Heimson’s information state where there is an
“epistemic counterpart” of Heimson who is Hume.17
Santorio’s picture shares with Cumming’s the feature that the epistemic operators uns-
electively bind all the variables in thier scope. Santorio (2012) doesn’t mention quantifying
in, but prefixing an objectual quantifier to an epistemically modalised sentence won’t end
up being vacuous on his account. This is due to the “check” on the counterpart functions in
the first conjunct , which ensures that the counterpart function applied to the input world
aligns with the initial assignment. Given this check, a modal sentence such as “might φ”
is still sensitive in the requisite way to the initial variable assignment.
Dilip Ninan has a series of papers (Ninan 2012, Ninan 2013, and Ninan forthcoming),
where he makes similar use of assignment-sensitive content and “multi-centered worlds”.
16Here we treat ‘Hume’ as a constant h, but this is just for ease of illustration. On a fuller account, all names,
pronouns, and variables will be rendered are assignment-sensitive terms.
17On this view, like the ones discussed above, an identity “x = y” will not be epistemically necessary, since
the necessity claim will fail as long as there is an accessible point 〈g,w〉where g(x) , g(y).
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Ninan (2012) closely resembles the counterpart semantics described in the previous section,
though it has additional bells and whistles.18 In a more recent paper Ninan forthcoming
presents a puzzle, which can be used to motivate epistemic counterpart semantics.19 The
puzzle begins with this scenario:
There is a lottery with only two tickets, a blue ticket and a red ticket. The tickets are
also numbered 1 and 2, but we don’t know which colour goes with which number.
(Assume the number of the ticket is printed on one side of the ticket and the colour
on the back.) The winner has been drawn, and we know that the blue ticket won. But
since we don’t know whether the blue ticket is ticket 1 or ticket 2, we don’t know the
number of the winning ticket.
We can present the front and back of the tickets, in no particular order, as follows (with
the blue ticket indicated as the winner):
1 2
Front of tickets Back of tickets
← winner
Ninan’s puzzle proceeds by the following reasoning about this scenario:
(A) Ticket 1 is such that it might be the winning ticket.
(B) Ticket 2 is such that it might be the winning ticket.
18An earlier version of this paper surveyed Ninan (2012) and compared it to the views of Cumming and
Santorio, but when doing the final revision for this paper Ninan sent me his new paper “Quantification and
Epistemic Modality”, which I focus on here since it provides a strong argument for the epistemic counterpart
semantics I outlined above.
19Closely related puzzles are discussed in Aloni (2005) and Gerbrandy (2000). Of course, epistemic puzzles
in this general vicinity have been discussed for years under the heading of puzzles of de re beliefs.
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Since those are the only tickets, it follows that any ticket is such that it might be the winning
ticket. But the red ticket is a ticket, so it follows that:
(C) The red ticket is such that it might be the winning ticket.
Thus, the puzzle is that from the apparently acceptable (A) and (B) we seem to be able
to conclude the apparently unacceptable (C). (A) and (B) seem acceptable since we don’t
know the number of the winning ticket. But (C) seems unacceptable since we know
that the red ticket lost. The reasoning from (A) and (B) to (C) seems valid, and given
the standard Kripke-style semantics, it is valid. As Ninan notes the puzzle specifically
concerns epistemic modals—there is no analogous puzzle with metaphysical modals (e.g.
“The red ticket might have been the winning ticket” is perfectly acceptable). As an
account of epistemic modality, the standard view is faced with the choice of denying the
conjunction of (A) and (B) or accepting (C). Neither option looks plausible.
This provides motivation for seeking an alternative account—of course, it is more-
or-less the same kind motivation I’ve been harping on at various points in this paper,
but Ninan’s puzzle affords a clear and concise way of making the problem vivid. Ninan
outlines two alternatives, which solve the puzzle. Importantly both alternatives abandon
the “objectual” aspect of standard Kripke semantics, whereby variables are both rigid and
immune to shifting by modals. Ninan insists that the way forward is to take on board the
Quinean insight that “being necessarily or possibly thus and so is not a trait of the object
concerned, but depends on the manner of referring to the object” (Quine 1953a: 148).
The first alternative Ninan develops builds on the dynamic proposal of Yalcin (2015)
by supplementing it with Carnapian individual concepts, while the second alternative
generalises the standard semantics with counterpart relations. The key to both approaches
is that they allow us to say that object o′ in world w′ represents object o in world w even if o
is not identical to o′. To implement the counterpart version of this Ninan adopts the kinds
of models we defined above, where A = {W,R,D, I}, And then introduces counterpart
relations which are binary relations on D × W. Second, he construes the counterpart
relation as a parameter of the index (instead of as fixed in the model).20 Thus he defines
20Schwarz (2012) and Cresswell and Hughes (1996) provide essentially the same semantics as Ninan, but
they define the counterpart relation as an element of the model. The difference here doesn’t matter much
in terms of the pure semantics, but may lead to differences in implementation with the post-semantics
definition of truth, under the assumption that context supplies the counterpart relation. Presumably Ninan
is anticipating a standard Kaplanian definition of truth-in-a-context, and he includes the counterpart relation
as a parameter of the index in order to secure the contextual variability of the counterpart relation. That is, it
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the truth of a formula relative to a counterpart relation K in addition to a world w and a
variable assignment g (and a model A). All clauses ignore the counterpart parameter and
are thus essentially the same as on the Kripke-semantics, save for epistemic “must” and
“might”, which are defined as follows:
• JφKg,w,K = 1 iff JφKg′,w′,K = 1,
for all w′ such that wRw′ and for all g′ such that for each variable i, 〈g(i),w〉K〈g′(i),w′〉.
• J^φKg,w,K = 1 iff JφKg′,w′,K = 1,
for some w′ such that wRw′ and for some and g′ such that for each variable i,
〈g(i),w〉K〈g′(i),w′〉.
We can now model the lottery scenario. Let ‘W’ be the predicate for “winning ticket”,
let ‘t1’ go proxy for ‘ticket 1’, and let ‘t2’ go proxy for ‘ticket 2’. Then (A) and (B) will be
rendered in our language as follows:21
(A′) ^Wt1
(B′) ^Wt2
The truth-conditions for each of these are as follows:
A′: J^Wt1Kg,w,K = 1 iff JWt1Kg′,w′,K = 1,
for some w′ such that wRw′ and for some and g′ such that 〈g(t1),w〉K〈g′(t1),w′〉.
B′: J^Wt2Kg,w,K = 1 iff JWt2Kg′,w′,K = 1,
for some w′ such that wRw′ and for some and g′ such that 〈g(t2),w〉K〈g′(t2),w′〉.
is an important aspect of this approach that which object-in-a-world represents another object-in-a-world is
something that can vary with the utterance context.
21Ninan symbolises these with lambda binding—(λx.^Wx)(t1) and (λx.^Wx)(t2)—in order to ensure that
the modal predications are read de re. After all the stilted “is such that” locution is employed so that the
sentences are read de re. We could easily add lambdas to our language to do this as well, or we could fake it
with constructions such as “t1 = x ∧^Wx”. But we needn’t do this—Ninan does because he is being neutral
on whether or not t1 and t2 are descriptions or names. Since we are assuming that t1 and t2 are variables these
further complications are actually unnecessary.
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To make things concrete assume the domain only has two tickets so that D = {a, b}, and
assume that that g(t1) = a and g(t2) = b. Then we can see that (A′) is true just in case there
is an accessible world where a counterpart of a under relation K is W, and (B′) is true just
in case there is an accessible world where a counterpart of b under relation K is W. Thus
the truth of the conjunction of (A′) and (B′) entails that anything might be W:
J∀x^WxKg,w,K = 1 iff for all g′ that differ from g at most in that g′(x) , g(x), JWxKg′′,w′,K = 1,
for some w′ such that wRw′ and for some and g′′ such that 〈g′(x),w〉K〈g′′(x),w′〉.
That is, anything might be W iff for each individual x in the domain there is an accessible
world where a counterpart of x under K is W. And that follows if:
(i) a and b are the only members of the domain and
(ii) there is an accessible world where a counterpart of a under K is W and
(iii) there is an accessible world where a counterpart of b under K is W.
But now what about the crucial sentence (C): “The red ticket is such that it might be the
winner”. Let ‘r’ go proxy for “The red ticket” (where again we are reading the sentence de
re so we are assuming that ‘r’ is a name or variable.) So we have:
(C′) ^Wr
And its truth-conditions are given as follows:
C′: J^WrKg,w,K = 1 iff JWrKg′,w′,K = 1,
for some w′ such that wRw′ and for some and g′ such that 〈g(r),w〉K〈g′(r),w′〉.
Given that a and b are the only things in the domain, g(r) = a or g(r) = b. And on either
choice we can see that (C′) follows from (A′) and (B′). That is, (C′) is true just in case there
is an accessible world where a counterpart of g(r) under K is W. And that is guaranteed
given the truth of both (A′) and (B′) (plus the assumptions about the domain and that
g(t1) , g(t2)).
At this point one might think the counterpart theory has failed to diagnose the puzzle,
since the argument comes out as valid! The whole problem was that we want to accept (A′)
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and (B′) without accepting (C′). So how is this any help? While the argument is formally
valid according to the counterpart semantics, the story I’ve told so far hasn’t made full use
of the counterpart-theoretic resources. In giving the formal argument we’ve just assumed
some generic counterpart relation that we’ve held fixed throughout. Yet Ninan’s lottery
scenario is specifically designed to make two counterpart relations salient:
Kn = the number counterpart relation, which holds between ticket t in world w and
ticket t′ in world w′ iff t in w and t′ in w′ have the same number.
Kc = the colour counterpart relation, which holds between ticket t in world w and ticket
t′ in world w′ iff t in w and t′ in w′ are the same colour.
The counterpart-theoretic diagnosis of the puzzle insists that we want to accept (A′) and
(B′) relative to counterpart relation Kn and we want to deny (C′) relative to counterpart
relation Kc. Although (C′) is true relative to Kn it is practically impossible to utter “The
red ticket is such that it might be the winner” without making the the colour counterpart
relation salient. Likewise although (A′) and (B′) are false relative to Kc it is difficult, if
not impossible, for that counterpart relation to be salient in a context in which a and b are
referred to as Ticket 1 and Ticket 2. Thus, the solution in terms of epistemic counterpart
semantics is a contextualist solution—there is contextual variability of the counterpart
relation (cf. Lewis 1983: 43-43; Lewis 1986: 251-263), and the contexts in which we
want to accept the premises are different from the contexts in which we want to deny the
conclusion.
This proposal is similar in spirit to various proposals that have been around forever.
In particular, epistemic counterpart semantics bears an affinity to both a Carnapian se-
mantics in terms of individual concepts (Carnap 1947 and Aloni 2005) and epistemic
two-dimensionalism (Chalmers 2004). In fact, some of the formal devices that are employ
by these approaches are more-or-less the same. There are many choice points within these
frameworks and given the right tweaks on both ends we might even get to the same
mathematical structure.22
Even though the picture shares some features with descriptivist views, it doesn’t seem
threatened by familiar anti-descriptivist arguments. It is important to notice that the epis-
temic counterpart relations that are associated with terms are not lexicalized, they are
22One obvious difference is that individual concepts and primary intensions are functional, whereas coun-
terpart relations are not so constrained.
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instead determined by the context. (For example, the number relation and the colour re-
lation are not somehow lexically attached to “Ticket 1” and “The red ticket”, respectively.)
Thus, there is no commitment to the idea that names (or variables) are synonymous with
descriptions, nor to the idea that the referent of a name is determined via description.
Kripke’s (1980) arguments, then, can’t seem to get off the ground, if aimed at the epistemic
counterpart approach. For example consider the argument from ignorance. If in a given
context c the subject thinks of Cicero simply as “a Roman orator”, then “Cicero” in that
context still manages to refer to Cicero because the way the subject thinks of Cicero is
irrelevant to the determination of the referent of “Cicero”. Of course, the way the subject
thinks of Cicero, in a sense, determines the referent of “Cicero” in the agent’s “epistemic
worlds”—in every world compatible with the subject’s knowledge the epistemic counter-
parts of Cicero are Roman orators. But its not clear what the objection to this could be.
Whereas with standard descriptivism, Carnapian individual concepts, or epistemic two-
dimensionalism the function from worlds to individuals is lexically associated with the
singular term, and it is this assumption in particular that is leveraged against those views.
Of course, such views could be modified so that the mode of presentation is detached
from reference determination and so that there is contextual variability of the relevant in-
tensions. There has yet to be a detailed survey of these various accounts comparing them
formally, and mapping out where there are genuine differences and where the differences
are merely notational. This should be done. But in any case, I predict that the flexibility
and generality of the epistemic counterpart approach outlined above will be seen as a
virtue.
Appendix: Quantified metaphysical and epistemic modality
I present a simple language incorporating the lessons from above. The language will be
a mixed modal language with both objective modals and epistemic modals, and it will
also have individual quantifiers.23 Interestingly, we can model some version of Kripke’s
cases of the aposteriori necessities and apriori contingencies, in way that (prima facie)
differs from the two-dimensionalist models (e.g. Davies and Humberstone 1980). Here’s
23It is not strictly necessary to lexically distinguish the metaphysical and epistemic modals, I do that here
just for perspicuity. One could easily make this in line with the proposal of Kratzer (1977), by letting the
context fix the accessibility relation between assignment-world pairs, where metaphysical contexts would
turn out to set the counterpart relation to identity.
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the language.
Variables: x, y, z, . . .
Predicates: F,G,H, . . .
Constants: ¬,∧, ∃, =, , 
For any sequence of variables, α1, . . . , αn, any n-place predicate pi, and any variables α and
β, the sentences of the language are provided by the following grammar:
φ ::= piα1 . . . αn | α = β | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | ∃αφ | φ | φ
Let a modelA = 〈W,R,K,D, I〉, where W is a (non-empty) set of worlds, R is a binary relation
on W (a metaphysical accessibility relation), K is a binary relation on DN×W (an epistemic
accessibility relation), D is a (non-empty) set of individuals, and I is the interpretation,
which relative to a world assigns the predicates sets of tuples of individuals drawn from D.
(Again we present a constant domain semantics for ease, while we really prefer a variable
domain.) We then provide the semantic clauses relative to a model A as follows:
• JαKg,w = g(α)
• Jpiα1 . . . αnKg,w = 1 iff 〈Jα1Kg,w, . . . , JαnKg,w〉 ∈ I(pi,w)
• Jα = βKg,w = 1 iff JαKg,w = JβKg,w
• J¬φKg,w = 1 iff JφKg,w = 0
• Jφ ∧ ψKg,w = 1 iff JφKg,w = 1 and JψKg,w = 1
• J∃αφKg,w = 1 iff for some g′ that differs from g at most in that g′(α) , g(α),JφKg′,w = 1
• JφKg,w = 1 iff for all w′ such that wRw′, JφKg,w′ = 1
• JφKg,w = 1 iff for all w′ and g′ such that 〈w, g〉K〈w′, g′〉, JφKg′,w′ = 1
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This kind of model can deal with the puzzles concerning epistemic modality de re, that we
have covered in the paper.24 It also affords a kind of diagnosis of the Kripkean necessary
a posteriori and contingent apriori. Here is a brief sketch. First, a posteriori necessities:
(17) Hesperus couldn’t have failed to be Phosphorus.
::  h = p
(18) Hesperus might not be Phosphorus.
:: ¬ h = p
The metaphysical claim (17) is straightforwardly true, assuming h = p; while the epistemic
might-claim (18) is also true under certain epistemic counterpart relations, e.g. the coun-
terpart relations that would be relevant in a context in which Pythagorus utters it. Next,
cases of the contingent apriori:
(19) Julius has to be the inventor of the zip
::  Zj
(20) Julius could have failed to invent the zip
:: ¬ Zj
Of course the truth of (19) depends on which counterpart relation is contextually salient.
And it is plausible that in a context where we have just introduced the name “Julius” as a
name of the inventor of the zip, every epistemic counterpart of Julius will be a zip inventor.
Nevertheless, (20) is true for the familiar reason that zip-inventing is a contingent property
of Juluis.25
24I have included the counterpart relation as a part of the model, but for the reasons mentioned in footnote
20, if this type of model is employed in a natural language setting where there is contextual variability we
ought to construe the counterpart relation as an index in the point of reference.
25An open question is how this system fares in terms of what Chalmers and Rabern (2014) call the generalized
nesting problem, although it appears promising since it would seem to invalidate (A2).
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